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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,:
-v-

Case No. 18975

THOMAS LOWELL SPRAGUE,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was chared by information

with

distribution of a controlled substance for value under Utah
Code

58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)

(1982).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and foun<'I guilty
of distribution of a controlled substance for value on
December 6, 1982 in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and
for Sanpete County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don
presiding.

v.

Tibbs,

On January 5, 1983, appellant was sentenced to a

suspended, indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed
five years and a suspended fine of $4,000.

Appellant was

fined $1,000 and placed in the county jail for a period of
ninety days reviewable after thirty days in light of
appellant's progress.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court af firmin0
the verdict and judgment of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Deputy James Tauffer of the Sanpete County Sheriff's
Department was working as an undercover agent when he
initiated contact with appellant on August 19, 1982 at 10 p.m.
in a parking lot across from the Manti temple in Manti, Utah
(T. 64-67).

Tauffer and appellant conversed between their

pickup trucks for a while before Tauffer asked appellant if he
knew where Tauffer could purchase one quarter ounce of
marijuana (T. 67).

Appellant replied "at that time he didn't

and that our best bet would be in Provo, that it was pretty
dry down here at that time, and at this time he

[appellant]

gave me his name and his number and told me [Tauf fer]
could call him back later."

that I

(T.67).

No phone contacts occurred before Tauffer's second
meeting with appellant on August 27, 1983 at appellant's place
of work, Mr. Chainsaw in Manti, Utah ( T. 68).

When Tauffer

again expressed an interest in the purchase of a quarter ounce
of marijuana, appellant said that he was going to Gunnison and
might fina some (T. 69).

Tauffer asked where they could meet

and appellant suggested that he would find Tauffer later that
evening in Ephraim (T. 69).

Tauffer waited for appellant on

August 27 in Ephraim, but appellant never appeared (T. 69).
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A third contact occurred on August 31, 1982, as
Deputy Tauffer encountered appellant at the Bright Spot
restaurant

in Manti (T. 69).

Tauffer asked why appellant had

missed their second meeting.

Appellant replied that he could

not find any marijuana in Gunnison hut asked if Tauffer was
then interested in purchasing a gram of marijuana (T. 69-70).
Tauffer asked about the price and appellant said, "$10.00 a
gram."

(T. 70).

Tauffer requested to see the marijuana before

his purchase (T. 70).

Appellant replied that he would have to

go get it and left while Tauffer waited at the Brite Spot (T.
70).
Appellant returned "a little bit later"
brought Tauffer out to the parking lot ( T. 70).
showed Tauffer the marijuana,

(T. 70) and
Appellant

introduced him to a friend in

appellant's car, and took the ten dollars from Tauffer.
Appellant testified that he had gone to the home of
Clark Johnson, returned with Johnson to the Bright Spot and
later that evening gave Johnson the ten dollars (T. 108-110).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPED BY THE
UNDERCOVER POLICE
Appellant claims as a positive nefense that he was
entrapped, Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-303 (1982),

into distributin')

a controlled substance for value unner Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii).

Appellant's motion to dismiss on the

basis of entrapment ( T. 91) was nenied

( T. 95).

Al though a

jury instruction on entrapment was given (#15, R.54),
appellant was found guilty of distribution of a controlled
substance for value (R. 61).
Entrapment is recognized as a defense in Utah Code
Ann.§ 76-2-303(1)

(1953), as amended:

It is a defense that the actor was
entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting
in co-operation with the officer induces
the commission for prosecution by methods
creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it.
Conduct
merely affording a person an opportunity
to commit on offense does not constitute
entrapment
Utah had traditionally adopted the subjective test of
entrapment as exemplified in State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148,
369 P.2d 494, 496 (1962).

The subjective test asked (1)

whether there was an inducement and

-4-

(2)

if so, whether the

defenclant showecl any predisposition to commit the offense.l
Although Pacheco, supra was construed initially as consistent
with the passage in 1973 of§ 76-2-303(1),2 this Court later
recognizecl that the explicit wording of§ 76-2-303(1)
incorporates the objective standard of entrapment.

State v.

Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979).
The objective test focuses not on the predisposition
of the defendant, but "on whether the police conduct revealed
in the particular case falls below standards, to which common
feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power."
Id. at 500.

The test to determine an unlawful entrapment

examines whether the officer "induced the defendant to commit
such an offense by persuasion or inducement which woulcl be
effective to persuade an average person, other than one who
was merely given the opportunity to commit the offenses."
at 503.

Id.

Examples of prohibited police conduct are "extreme

pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on
sympathy, pity or close personal friendship or offers of
inordinate sums of money."

Taylor, at 503;

Grossman v.

State, 457 P.2d 226-230 (AK. 1969).

1 The subjective test is adopted in Sorrells v. U.S., 287
u.s. 435, 53 s.ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932);
see generally:
62 A.LR. 3d 110, Anno.:
Modern Status of the Law Concerning
Entrapment to Commit Narcotics Offense -- State Cases, § 2(a),
p. 114.
2 State v. Curtis, Utah, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975).
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Appellant was not entrapped but merely afforded an
opportunity to commit the charged offense.
met appellant three times.

Office Tauffer ha4

Their relationshir of casual

friendship, was not analogous to the emotion al at tachrnent u'""d
by the girlfriend police aqent in Taylor (girlfriPnd was
former lover, a cohabitant with the defendant and pleaded with
the ex-addict defendant to help her avoid withdrawal pains).
Each of the first two encounters between appellant and Tauf fer
errled with appellant expressing knowledge of available
supplies in the area and making tentative promises to secure
marijuana in contrast with the unencouraged and repeated phone
followups by the police agent in State v. Kourbelas, Utah, 621
P.2d 1238 (1980).

Officer Tauffer's three contacts were

merely conscientious, police work follow-ups based on a
contact.
At no time did appellant refuse to be involved in
the sale of marijuana to Tauffer.

The practicalities of

police undercover investigations require that the officer make
at least sufficient effort to earn the confidence of a wary
seller.

The line that distinguishes gaining the confidence of

a wary seller from creating such confidence as to constitute
an inducement or entrapment cannot be quantified by the number
of contacts or magical words that are exchangen between one
party and another.

Instead, an examination of the quality of

contacts occurring in a given situation will disclose "whether
the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below

-6-

standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper
use of government power.

Taylor at 500.

Appellant initiated

the offer of a current sale during the meeting at the Brite
Spot cafe. (T. 69-70).

Therefore, Tauffer's effort in

contacting appellant did not create a "substantial risk that
the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to
commit it."

Utah Code Ann.,

E>

76-2-303(1)

(1982).

State v. Ontiveros, No. 19021 (Filed November 9,
1983) reversed a conviction of defendant under Utah Code Ann.
58-37-8(1) (a) (ii)

(1982) commenting that defendant should

have been charged not with distributing a controlled substance
for value but with arranging for the distribution of a
controlled substance for value, Utah Code Ann.
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv)

(1982).

Ontiveros at 3.

i;;

Although the facts

of this case are similar, appellant here returned with the
marijuana and gave it to the officer and received payment.

In

Ontiveros, the defendant received money from the officer, then
left to procure the marijuana from an assumed third party and
then returned to give the marijuana to the officer. In the
instant case, however, at no time did Tauffer see appellant
give the money to a third party nor did appellant ever
represent to Tauf fer that the payment was for a third party.
Although the defendant in Ontiveros claimed
insufficiency of the evidence, appellant does not argue on
appeal either the insufficiency of the evidence or the
provisions under which he was charged.
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A theory not presented

on appeal will re regarded as having heen ahanclonecl.

Gunnar

v. Brice, 17 Wash. App. 819, 565 P.2d 1212, 1214 (1977);
Hojem v. Kelley, 21 Wash. App. 200, 584 P.2rl 4'il, 4'i4 n.1
(1978)

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
THAT DEFENDANT HAD BEEN CHARGED WITH A
SUBSEQUENT DRUG OFFENSE.
Appellant contends that the trial court improperly
admitted evidence of a subsequent charge for the sale of
mushrooms to Ed Spann, an undercover agent present at officer
Tauffer's first meeting with the appellant.

Appellant's

counsel objected at trial that the cross-examination of
appellant on the subsequent charge was irrelevant to
appellant's defense of entrapment (T. 113-114).

On the

contrary, the trial court properly allowed such
cross-examination under Ut. R. Evia. 55 (1983) as evidence of
a prior criminal act to prove a material fact, i.e. appellant
intended to keep for his own value the SlO given him by Deputy
Tauffer.
Rule 55 provides that:
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person
committed a crime or civil wrong on a
specified occasion, is inadmissible to
prove his disposition to commit crime or
civil wrong as the basis for an inference
that he committed another crime or civil
wrong on another specified occassion but,
subject to Rule 45 and 48, such evidence
is admissible when relevant to prove some
other material fact including abscence of
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowlege or
identity.
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involves the prosecutor's cross-examination of appellant (T.
110-113).

Appellant claimed that after having delivered the

gram of marijuana to Deputy Tauffer, he got back in the car
with Clark Johnson and gave Johnson the $10.00 (T.110-111).
The prosecutor next asked appellant, "Now, is that something,
Mr. Sprague, that you do often is sell marijuana for your
friends?
A.

No.

Q.

Have You ever done it before?

A.

No

Q.

Have you even been charged with a similar

A.

Never

Q.

Never have been charged with a similar

A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever been charged with any kind of drug

Tauffer.

violation?

violation?

offense in Utah County?
A.

No.

Q. Never?
A.

(T.111).

No.

After a conference outside the presence of the jury,

objection by appellant's counsel was overruled.
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The

prosecutor continued his line of questioning to explore
whether appellant was selling the drug:

Q. Now, I think if I understood you
correctly a moment ago you said you have
never sold any drugs other than this one
time for which we're here today.
Would
you care to give us some explanation to
the Utah County charge?
A. What I mean is I don't sell for a
profit or anything like that.
I don't get
mixed in with money deals or anything.
(T. 114).

Appellant's answer reflects this interpretion of

the prosecutor's questions about the subsequent sales.

The

questions explore evidence of criminal drug sale to show
appellant's intent to keep the $10.00 given him by the Deputy
Tauffer in exchange for the marijuana.
In State v. Tanner, No.

(Utah November 15,

1983) this Court reaffirmed the admissability under Rule 55 of
"evidence of other crimes or civil

[wrong]

that is competent

and relevant to prove some material fact, other to show merely
the general disposition of the defendant."

Id. at 9.

In the

instant case, the prosecutor's "other crime" inquires were
relevant in proving appellant's intent to keep the ten dollars
given to him by Officer Tauffer, a material fact of the
charged offense of Distribution of a Controlled Substance for
value.
Appellant correctly argues that such evidence was
irrelevant to rebut the defense of entrapment.

However, the

questions were relevant to prove a material fact of intent to
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distribute a controlled substance for value under Utah Code
Ann.<;;

58-37-B(l)(a)(ii)

(1983).

Ut. R.

Evid. 55 (1983).

CONCLUSION
Appellant was not entrapped into distributing a
controlled substance for value.

Officer Tauffer initiated two

casual contacts with appellant.

On the third contact

appellant offered to sell Tauffer a gram of marijuana.
Officer Tauffer's efforts in no way badgered, pleaaed or
manipulated appellant to such an extent that appellant was
entrappea via the "objective stanctard" of entrapment.
The trial court properly admitted evidence disclosed
through cross-examination of appellant.

The fact that

appellant had been charged with a subsequent drug offense was
relevant under Ut. R. Evia. S'i to estabish appellant's intent
to keep the ten dollar payment received from Officer Tauffer
in exhange for the gram of marijuana.
This Court should affirm appellant's conviction of
distributing a controlled substance for value.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this (.,+{...day of January,
19 84.
DAVID L. WILKINSON,

General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy
of the foregoing Brief, postage pre paid to SHELDEN R. CARTCR,
attorney for appellant, 350 East Center, Provo, Utah
day of January, 1984.
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